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Remedies
By KENNETH B. GERMAIN *
I. WRONGFUL DEATH RECOVERY WHERE A JOINT TORmASOR
IS A STATUTORY BENEFICIARY
In Cox v. Cooper' a woman in her eighth month of preg-
nancy was a passenger in an automobile driven by her hus-
band. Due to the joint negligence of her husband and the driver
of another automobile, a collision occurred, killing the unborn
infant and injuring the woman so seriously that a hysterectomy
was necessary. The woman sued both drivers in her individual
capacity and as administratrix of her deceased infant's estate.
The jury awarded verdicts of $53,660 and $40,196 respectively,
and explicitly indicated that the awards were to be apportioned
50% apiece against the two defendants, who, in its view had
equally contributed to the accident. Consequently, judgment
was entered against each of the defendants for half of the plain-
tiff's individual damages and for half of the wrongful death
recovery less the father's beneficial interest. The plaintiff thus
recovered $26,830 against each defendant in her individual
capacity and $10,098 against each defendant in her represent-
ative capacity.
Numerous appeals were filed. Of most interest are plain-
tiff's claim that the judgment should have been rendered for
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, Rutgers Univer-
sity; J.D. 1969, New York University School of Law.
1 510 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1974).
2 Although the actual judgment papers show the figure at $10,275, the Court of
Appeals opinion suggests the $10,098 figure. The discrepancy is apparently attribut-
able to the circuit court's inclusion of an additional $177 per defendant for the costs
of administration of the deceased infant's estate. Compare Cooper v. Cox, No. 19130,
Judgment 3-4, (Kenton Circuit Ct., filed Nov. 16, 1970) with Cox v. Cooper, 510
S.W.2d 530, 532, 537 & n.5 (Ky. 1974). Although the inclusion of an amount for the
costs of administration is totally unsupported by case law, it is quite consistent with
the somewhat strained statutory interpretation the Court of Appeals used to approve
recognition of funeral expenses as an item of wrongful death damages in Square Deal
Cartage Co. v. Smith's Adm'r, 210 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Ky. 1948). The Court of Appeals'
opinion in Cox does not address this item, probably because the defendants did not
take an appeal on the matter. For purposes of this discussion the Court of Appeals'
figure will be used.
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"joint" rather than "several" liability and plaintiff's attorneys'
appeal that their contingent fee award regarding the wrongful
death action should have been based on the full verdict ren-
dered by the jury, without a deduction for the amounts disal-
lowed to the tortfeasor-father3
The issue of whether the judgment should have been
"joint"-recoverable to its full extent against either of the de-
fendants-or "several"-recoverable only to the extent of the
portions specifically designated by the judgment-is deter-
mined by recourse to § § 454.040 and 412.030 of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes [hereinafter cited as KRS]. Section 454.040
provides:
In actions of trespass the jury may assess joint or several
damages against the defendants. When the jury finds several
damages, the judgment shall be in favor of the plaintiff
against each defendant for the several damages, without re-
gard to the amount of damages claimed in the petition, and
shall include a joint judgment for the costs. 4
Section 412.030 provides: "Contribution among wrongdoers
3 Cox, the unrelated defendant, also appealed the denial of her motions for di-
rected verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but the circuit court's rul-
ings were upheld. Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d 530, 533-35 (Ky. 1974). Likewise, Cox's
protestation that the verdict of $40,000 for the death of the unborn infant was excessive
was rebuffed on the authority of Modem Bakery, Inc. v. Brashear, 405 S.W.2d 742,
745 (Ky. 1966), wherein an award of $37,200 for the death of a child with a life
expectancy of 63 years was upheld. 510 S.W.2d at 535. The standard to be used in
ascertaining damages in this type of case was recently set out in Rice v. Rizk, 453
S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1970): "The measure of damages in a wrongful death action involving
an infant is the destruction of the infant's power to earn money." Id. at 735 (emphasis
added); accord, Hale v. Hale, 230 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Ky. 1950). Cox's further protesta-
tion that the award of $50,000 for the plaintiff's pain and suffering was excessive also
met with failure, even though the Court noted that there was no proof of any perma-
nent loss of earning capacity on the part of the plaintiff. On this point the Court's
specific language may be instructive for future cases:
We think the shock and grief that must surely attend the killing of an eight-
month child in its mother's womb is beyond human calculation. Quite aside
from [plaintiff's] also having been rendered incapable of bearing any more
children, that alone is enough to sustain this verdict.
510 S.W.2d at 535.
Ky. REv. STAT. § 454.040 (1970) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. It is noteworthy
that this statute is probably the only one of its kind in the United States and that in
the rest of the states it is assumed that "no rational division can be made" regarding
the responsibility of joint tortfeasors. W. PRossER, LAw op ToRTs § 52, at 316 n.39 (4th
ed. 1971).
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may be enforced where the wrong is a mere act of negligence
and involves no moral turpitude." 5 Pursuant to his interpreta-
tion of these statutes, the circuit judge had given written in-
structions to the jury, indicating that it was entitled to
apportion the total recovery between the two defendants.6 This,
of course, opened the door for the "several" verdict to which
the plaintiff took exception. The Court of Appeals, in affirming
both the circuit judge's interpretation of the statutes and the
questions he submitted to the jury, took the occasion to clarify
several aspects of these statutes.
The first matter broached by the Court was the standard
for apportionment between or among joint tortfeasors under
KRS § 454.040. That section itself is completely silent on the
matter, merely stating that "the jury may assess joint or sev-
eral damages." 7 The Court reviewed some of its earlier deci-
sions on the issue, pointing out that a line of cases starting in
18881 and continuing to the 1970 case of Orr v. Coleman had
indicated that culpability was the relevant yardstick. However,
the Court also noted that the Orr case had in fact correctly held
that the crucial standard was causation rather than
culpability: "[W]hen it is considered that mere culpability
has no relationship to a tort except insofar as it is a cause of
the injury, the only logical basis for an apportionment is
causation rather than degree of negligence."10 Thus, the Court
declared that the jury instruction used in Orr, framed in terms
of the percentage of causation attributable to the negligence of
5 KRS § 412.030.
1 The actual questions and answers in the circuit court were as follows:
5-Do you wish to apportion the total finding of damages. . . between the
defendants according to the amount of negligence which you believe to be
attributable to each defendant that you have found to be negligent? (Yes)
6-If your answer to the above question is "yes" state, percentage-wise, how
much of the total should be paid by:
Defendant. . .Cox (50%)
Defendant. .. [father] (50%)
Total (the total of the answers must
equal 100%) (100%)510 S.W.2d at 536.
7 KRS § 454.040, quoted in text accompanying note 4 supra.
s Central Passenger Ry. v. Kuhn, 6 S.W. 441, 447 (Ky. 1888).
9 455 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky. 1970).
" 510 S.W.2d at 536 n.3 (emphasis by the Court).
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each tortfeasor,"' was "preferable" to instructions based on
culpability and to the instruction given in the instant case,
which did not specifically mention causation.
12
Although the bar should be thankful to the Court for at-
tempting to clarify the confusion 3 created by its earlier deci-
sion, 4 it is doubtful whether any real improvement has re-
sulted. While the new test, based on causation, is doctrinally
superior to its predecessor, which was based on culpability, it
too is very problematic in actual application. The problem, of
course, is how can the jury ascertain the portion of an indivisi-
ble injury that was caused by each of two or more joint tortfea-
sors? The danger inherent in such an approach seems not un-
like the danger existent under the earlier "culpability" ap-
proach-namely, that the jury would engage in speculation.'1
However, in the final analysis, the problem does not appear to
be a judicial one at all; any judicial interpretation of this stat-
ute will present serious problems of measurement. Neverthe-
less, from a policy viewpoint it may be deemed important
enough to try to apportion tort damages. Thus, the following
comment, though written when culpability was the standard,
may still adequately sum up the current situation, when causa-
tion is the test:
The same argument advanced against apportionment in
comparative negligence statutes . . .- that degrees of re-
sponsibility cannot be accurately allocated between parties
both at fault-may be urged against [the Kentucky
" Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59, 61-62 (Ky. 1970).
12 510 S.W.2d at 536 n.3. Although the Court used the term "preferable," and
indeed did not find reversible error in this case for failure to use the "causation"
instruction, circuit judges would be wise to take heed so as to avoid reversible error in
the future.
,U This confusion is exemplified by one student commentator's justifiable conclu-
sion that "the allocation of damages does not depend upon the determination of the
extent of injury caused by the negligence of each tortfeasor, but rests entirely on the
degree of his negligence." 48 Ky. L.J. 606, 607 (1960), referring to Murphy v. Taxicabs
of Louisville, Inc., 330 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1959).
" The confusion was aggravated by a 1963 case emphasizing the "participation
of the respective defendants in the tortious act." Elpers v. Kimbel, 366 S.W.2d 157,
161 (Ky. 1963).
1" 48 Ky. L.J. 606, 611 (1960): "It appears that the near impossibility of defining
a standard to measure degrees of culpability would result at times in an apportionment
based on nothing more than the mere conjecture of the jury."
[Voh. 63
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apportionment statute]. But although apportionment ac-
cording to fault may not result in exact justice, it more closely
approximates an equitable allocation than does an arbitrary
division according to the number of tortfeasors.'8
The second matter faced by the Court was the interaction
of §§ 454.040 and 412.030. The plaintiff argued that these stat-
utes, read together, required a joint verdict against the tortfea-
sors, plus apportionment between the tortfeasors only for the
purpose of contribution inter se. The Court, expressly recogniz-
ing that one of its earlier decisions seemed to substantiate this
view, "hasten[ed] to correct that impression."' 7 Thus, the
Court concluded:
From a literal construction of KRS 454.040 there can be little
doubt that when the jury chooses to apportion its award be-
tween or among joint tortfeasors their respective liabilities
become fixed and finally settled, not only as to the plaintiff
or plaintiffs, but as among themselves, except for the costs
of the proceeding, which the statute expressly reserves as a
joint liability. The applicability of KRS 412.030 is thus lim-
ited to the costs alone.' 8
As a result of the Court's holding, the plaintiff's recovery
is put in jeopardy whenever a jury elects to avail itself to a
several verdict under KRS § 454.040: "[Tihe risk of insol-
vency is shifted to the plaintiff since each defendant is liable
only for the several judgment entered against him. It appears
that this result would seriously impair the primary objectives
of victim compensation and loss distribution."' 9 Once again,
however, it should be recognized that a policy shortcoming of
this type cannot be blamed upon the judiciary. Rather, the
legislature should give some thought to amending KRS §
454.040 so as to limit the use of apportionment to the matter
" Legislation Note, 40 HARv. L. REv. 312, 318 (1935).
I7 510 S.W.2d at 536 & n.4, referring to Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky.
1970).
11 510 S.W.2d at 536-37; accord, S.W. Corum Hauling, Inc. v. Tilford, 511 S.W.2d
220, 223 (Ky. 1974).
I' 48 Ky. L.J. 606, 610 (1960); cf. Park, Comparative Negligence is Here Now, 39
Ky. BENCH & B. 19 (Jan. 1975). It might be noted that the Court did not address itself
to the interaction of §§ 454.040 and 412.030 in cases where the jury did not apportion
damages severally. It thus is unclear whether the apportionment approach of § 454.040
would be allowed in a § 412.030 contribution action. On this matter, see Park, supra.
1975]
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of contribution between tortfeasors inter se, thereby furthering
the basic tort law policy of compensation. 0
The other appeal of significance in Cox v. Cooper involves
the proper interpretation of the wrongful death statute, KRS
§ 411.130, in a case where one of the statutory beneficiaries was
also one of the tortfeasors who jointly caused the decedent's
death. In Cox, the father of the unborn child was found to have
been 50% responsible for the death. Thus, following the author-
ity of Bays v. Cox' Administrator,' the circuit judge deducted
the father's beneficial interest 2  from the verdicts rendered
against him and the other tortfeasor. As a necessary first step,
the gross judgment of $40,196 was lessened by the $196 worth
of funeral expenses, leaving the net amount of $40,000 as the
total beneficial interest of the estate. Ordinarily this $40,000
would have been divided equally between the decedent's two
living parents, pursuant to the wrongful death statute:
The amount recovered, less funeral expenses and the costs of
administration and costs of recovery including attorney fees,
not included in the recovery from the defendant, shall be for
the benefit of and go to the kindred of the deceased in the
following order:
If the deceased leaves no widow, husband, or child, then
the recovery shall pass to the mother and father of the
deceased, one moiety each, if both are living. . . and if
the father is dead and the mother living, the whole
thereof shall go to the mother.?3
20 The following statute would serve as an apt model for legislative consideration:
When there is such a disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors as to
render inequitable an equal distribution among them of the common liability
by contribution, the relative degrees of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be
considered in determining their pro rata shares solely for the purpose of
determining their rights of contribution among themselves, each remaining
severally liable to the injured person for the whole injury as at common law.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1002(4) (1962 repl. ed.); accord, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6302(d)
(1953). Of course the legislature could substitute "causation" in place of "fault" if it
so desired.
21 229 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1950).
2 In a case like this, involving the wrongful death of a minor, "beneficial interest"
means the amount of damages recoverable for the destruction of the decedent's power
to earn money. Id. at 740. Accord, Rice v. Rizk, 452 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Ky. 1970),
discussed in note 3 supra.
21 KRS § 411.130(2)(d). For some unaccountable reason, the Court of Appeals
referred to the general intestate succession statutes-KRS §§ 391.010 and
391.030-rather than the wrongful death statute. See 510 S.W.2d at 538 n.6.
[Vol. 63
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However, under the Bays rule, which is based on the general
tort principle that a person should not be entitled to profit from
his own wrong, the tortious father was prohibited from recover-
ing in this case, and the mother, the remaining beneficiary
under the statute, was allowed to recover only "her" beneficial
interest of $20,000 (i.e., 2 of the $40,000 "total" beneficial
interest). Because the jury had apportioned the damages
equally and severally against each of the two tortfeasors, judg-
ment was entered against each of them for $10,000 (plus, of
course, equal amounts to cover the funeral expenses).4 As a
result of this procedure, half of what would normally have gone
to the estate for distribution in accordance with KRS §
411.130(2) was not recovered because the two tortfeasors were
held to owe only half of the amounts normally due. However,
the mother actually received exactly as much as she would
have received if her husband had not been found jointly liable
for the tort. Her award of $20,000 was then treated by the
circuit court as the basis for determining the amount of her
attorneys' contingent fee, despite the attorneys' arguments
that the "total" beneficial interest (of $40,000) should have
been used.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the appealing attor-
neys' analysis and consequently affirmed the circuit court's
disposition of this issue. It sensibly reasoned that "[a] contin-
gent fee contract is based on the recovery, not the amount of
the verdict," and that the actual recovery in this case was
$20,000, not the "provisional or working figure" of $40,000.2
The Court summarily brushed aside the apparent conflict
between its decision and the language of KRS §§ 411.130(2),
which suggests that attorney's fees are to be deducted before
the beneficial recovery is distributed to the statutory benefici-
aries," by categorically stating that "[i]f there is any possible
24 Cooper v. Cox, No. 19130, Judgment 3-4 (Kenton Circuit Ct., filed Nov. 16,
1970). As discussed in note 2 supra, the Court also assessed equal amounts for the costs
of administering the decedent's estate.
21 510 S.W.2d at 538: "The amount of damages found by the verdict in this
particular situation is no more than a provisional or working figure from which the
recovery allowed in the judgment is to be computed. The fee cannot be assessed on
the basis of that which is not only unrecovered but unrecoverable."
" See the first paragraph of KRS § 411.130(2), quoted in the text accompanying
note 23 supra.
1975]
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twisting of KRS § 411.130 into a contrary aspect it is defeated
by simple logic. ' 2 More significantly, however, the Court
stated an important dictum directly impinging upon the Bays
rule and explicitly lamenting the plaintiff's failure to seek rev-
ersal of it:
As an original proposition, a good argument can be made to
the effect that in such a case the recovery to the estate should
not be diminished at all, because if it is . . . the wrongdoer
gains back half of what he loses. A better policy would pass
what would otherwise be his share of the recovery on to those
who would take it if he were dead. . . .We might have given
favorable consideration to adopting such a policy had the
administratrix brought the question to us, but sadly she did
not, so we must live for the time at least with the ruling in
Bays .... *28
There are only a few things to be said regarding the Court's
holding on the wrongful death portion of the case that the
attorney's contingent fee must be based upon the net judgment
granted to the plaintiff. First, the Court clearly reached the
"just" result; upholding the attorneys' claim would have re-
sulted in the plaintiff's having to pay an inordinate and unex-
pectedly high portion of her recovery to her attorneys. As the
Court aptly observed, the normal arrangement is for the attor-
ney to take a predetermined portion of the actual recovery
obtained by his client. Second, notwithstanding the "justness"
of the Court's decision, it should not have so cavalierly dis-
pensed with the wording of the wrongful death statute; the bar
deserves to know why a particular result is reached, not merely
what that result is. Moreover, it would be beneficial to know
the Court's reaction to the peculiar conflict-of-interest problem
created by its decision: Is not the personal representative's
attorney's loyalty to his client compromised when he realizes
that he can collect twice as much if one of the two alleged
tortfeasors (the statutory beneficiary) is not found liable?29 Per-
510 S.W.2d at 538.
23 Id.
" To quantify this problem, consider the attorney's plight in this case, assuming
a 30% contingency fee rate. Under the Bays rule, if both the father and the unrelated
party are found liable, the "estate's" $40,000 total beneficial recovery is "distributed"
as follows: Mother, $14,000; Father, nothing; Attorneys, $6,000; Total, $20,000 (since
[Vol. 63
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haps the Court deliberately chose to give this short shrift be-
cause it had de facto overruled Bays anyway, in which event
the problem would no longer exist." With this in mind, a care-
ful consideration of the Bays rule becomes important.
The Bays rule, which was reaffirmed by the Court as re-
cently as 1969,31 has a history dating back at least to 1908 when
Professor Wigmore suggested that an amount ordinarily paya-
ble to a tortious beneficiary should not have to paid at all, that
is, that the other beneficiaries' recoveries should not be aug-
mented at the expense of the paying defendants.2 By 1930 the
rule had gained considerable acceptance,33 and, in fact, was
included in a comment to the Restatement of Torts. 4 Bays, of
course, was not decided until 1950. Presently, the Bays rule has
the sanction of as eminent an authority as the late Dean
Prosser:
Where only one of several beneficiaries is contributorily negli-
gent, the better view, and now the prevailing one, is that the
action is not barred as to those who were not negligent, but
the father's beneficial interest is unrecoverable). However, if only the unrelated party
were found liable, then: Mother, $14,000; Father, $14,000; Attorneys, $12,000; Total,
$40,000. [N.B. These figures are based on the recovery the plaintiff seeks not as mother
of the decedent, but as the personal representative of the decedent suing on behalf of
its estate. Thus, the attorneys who represent her in this capacity really have the estate
as their client, not the mother as an individual; consequently, their fee shouldbe based
on whatever amount is "recovered," i.e., actually adjudged due, by all of the statutory
distributees, not only the mother-administratrix who hired them.]
Continuing the example from note 29, if Bays were discarded in favor of a rule
treating the tortious beneficiary (here the father) as dead for purposes of "distribution"
under the wrongful death statute, then the following recoveries would be realized: If
both alleged tortfeasors were found liable: Mother, $28,000; Father, nothing; Attorney,
$12,000; Total, $40,000. If only the unrelated party were found liable: Mother, $14,000;
Father, $14,000; Attorney, $12,000; Total, $40,000. Here the plaintiff's attorney's share
in the proceeds is not adversely affected by his success in proving that both of the
defendants were tortious.
31 City of Louisville v. Stuckenborg, 438 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Ky. 1969).
32 Wigmore, Contributory Negligence of the Beneficiary as a Bar to an
Administrator's Action for Death, 2 ILL. L. REv. 487, 495 n.37 (1908). Wigmore also
opined that decisions allowing tortious beneficiaries to recover indirectly-on the
theory that the "estate" recovered in full and could properly distribute the decedent's
"assets" as per the usual intestacy statutes-were "fallacious." Id. at 492. For a case
of this sort, see Oviatt v. Camarra, 311 P.2d 746 (Ore. 1957). See also RESTATEMENT
(SEcoNm) OF ToRTS § 493, comment a, 3 (1965).
Wettach, Wrongful Death and Contributory Negligence, 16 N.C.L. REv. 211,
228 (1937-38).
u RESTATEMENTr OFTOrS § 493, comment a, 1 (1939).
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that recovery is diminished to the extent of the damages of
the negligent beneficiary, who is denied all share in the pro-
ceeds.
Futhermore, the Restatement (Second) of Torts has retained
its original view in almost unchanged form:
Where the statute is [designed to compensate the survivors
for the benefits they would have derived from the earning
power of the decedent had his life not been cut short], the
fact that a beneficiary is himself guilty of negligence which
contributed to the death of the decedent does not prevent
recovery unless he is the sole beneficiary. It may, however,
affect the amount recoverable. If one of the beneficiaries is
guilty of contributory negligence he is in most jurisdictions
not allowed to benefit by the statute. The amount which he
would have received had he not been negligent is deducted
from the amount recoverable by the survivors as a group, the
rest being distributed among the survivors as though the neg-
ligent beneficiary did not exist. 6
Finally, there is ample case authority in agreement with Bays.37
Against this background stands KRS § 411.130, which by
its own terms could easily justify the rule suggested by the
Court of Appeals in Cox. This is so because the statute is div-
ided into two subsections, the first of which authorizes an ac-
tion for wrongful death damages by the personal representative
of the decedent,38 and the second of which is concerned solely
with the distribution of the "damages" authorized under the
first.39 Under this two-step approach, which was directly ap-
proved by the Court of Appeals in Bays,4" the loss caused by
the wrongful death is measured exclusively by the first subsec-
tion, which places no importance whatsoever on whose loss is
involved, for there is neither mention of, nor allusion to, any
beneficiary in particular. Indeed, the Court of Appeals' deci-
W. PRossER, LAw oF ToRrs § 127, at 913-14 (4th ed. 1971).
, RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRrs § 493, comment a, 1 (1965).
See, e.g., Walden v. Coleman, 124 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. 1962); Kokesh v. Prince, 161
N.W. 715 (Minn. 1917); Bartholomay v. St. Thomas Lumber Co., 148 N.W.2d 278
(N.D. 1966).
KRS § 411.130(1).
KRS § 411.130(2), quoted in relevant part in the text accompanying note 23
supra.
40 Bays v. Cox' Adm'r, 229 S.W.2d 737, 739-40 (Ky. 1950).
[Vol. 63
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sions on the determination of damages in wrongful death cases
have never treated the loss as personal to anyone.4 In other
words, this subsection is completely unconcerned with the
identity or number of the beneficiaries. The clear import of this
fact is that the damages are measured exclusively by reference
to the defendant himself.
On the other hand, the sole factor in determining the
distribution of the damages under the second subsection of
KRS § 411.130 is which potential beneficiaries are alive at the
moment of the decedent's death.41 In fact, in one fairly recent
case,43 there were substantial dicta to the effect that the full
amount determined under KRS § 411.130(1) would be recover-
able by a non-negligent parent whose spouse had contributed
to the death of their child, but who had predeceased the child.
This view, which would allow the fortuity of the earlier death
of the tortious beneficiary to affect the amount recoverable by
the innocent beneficiary, further suggests that the distribution
portion of the wrongful death statute works completely sepa-
rately from the damages portion. Moreover, it seems to provide
an easy transition to rejection of the Bays rule, probably
through the legal fiction of treating the tortious beneficiary as
having predeceased the wrongfully killed decedent. This could
be done as an "equitable" matter of decisional law, perhaps
even employing an analogy to the distribution of the property
of a decedent who was feloniously killed by one of his devisees
or heirs. In this type of case, a statute declares that the killer
forfeits all rights in the decedent's property, which is then dis-
tributed to the decedent's other heirs at law.44 Quite signifi-
cantly, the Court of Appeals has held that this statute operates
so as to treat the killer as having predeceased the decedent,
with the result that the killer's share can go to those who would
" See Empire Metal Corp. v. Wohlwender, 445 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Ky. 1969), in
which the Court said that "the statute ... does not provide for any scaling of the
recovery on the basis of who the beneficiaries are. . . ." The Court then went on to
reaffirm Freeman v. Oliver M. Elam, Jr., Co., 372 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Ky. 1963) by
"holding that the identity of the beneficiaries is 'not material to the issues' [regarding
the extent of liability]." See also Rice v. Rizk, 452 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Ky. 1970)
(discussed in note 3 supra); Hale v. Hale, 230 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Ky. 1950).
42 Sharp's Adm'r v. Sharp's Adm'r, 284 S.W.2d 673 (Ky. 1955).
" McCallum v. Harris, 379 S.W.2d 438, 443-44 (Ky. 1964).
" KRS § 381.280.
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have taken under those circumstances." This result was re-
cently applauded by a commentator who noted that the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals had "reached it in the face of inconsist-
ent statutory language."46
Under the approach the Court of Appeals has forecast in
Cox, the result will be that all of the tortfeasors will pay the
full damages assessed against them by the jury. Thus, under
Cox's facts, the father and the unrelated defendant each would
have to pay $20,098, all of which (less the lawyers' contingent
fee) would be payable to the innocent beneficiary (mother)
under the wrongful death statute. However, even this may not
be an appropriate result, for, to be realistic, whatever the
mother collects will inure to the benefit of the tortious father
since this type of a case is not likely to destroy their marriage,
and the father is not usually paying the award personally any-
way-his liability insurer will generally be responsible to the
extent of the policy limits. Consequently, the unrelated tortfea-
sor (and his insurance carrier) are likely to make a fairly con-
vincing argument that allowing a full recovery to the mother
circumvents the contributory negligence bar to his (their) det-
riment. Unfortunately, no perfect resolution to this problem
comes to mind.
I1. CONDEMNATION: JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE
VALUE OF PROPERTY TAKEN
In two cases decided on the same day, the Court of Appeals
" Bates v. Wilson, 232 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. 1950), noted in 39 Ky. L.J. 496 (1950-51).
' McGovern, Homocide and Succession to Property, 68 MicH. L. REv. 65, 73
(1969), directly referring to Bates v. Wilson, 232 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. 1950). Of course, this
analogy is somewhat rough, since the problem of distribution of assets other than
wrongful death proceeds is quite different from the instant one. Indeed, McGovern
expressly recognizes that "[d]ifferent problems arise if the killing was wrongful but
not intentional" with the result that the killer is not usually disqualified from receiving
the assets of the decedent. McGovern, supra at 92, citing Commercial Travelers Mut.
Accident Ass'n v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1966), in which a wife convicted of the
misdemeanor of involuntary manslaughter of her husband was allowed to collect the
accidental death insurance proceeds notwithstanding KRS § 381.280, which was held
literally inapplicable to nonfelonious killings, and despite the obvious confrontation
with the traditional maxim that one should not be allowed to profit by his own wrong.
On the analogous estate and insurance issues, see generally Carter v. Carter, 88
So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1956); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Wenckus, 244 A.2d 424 (Me. 1968);
R. KEz'roN, BAsic TEXT ON INsURANcE LAW § 4.11(g)(3) (1971); T. ATKmSo0, LAW OF
WniS 153-56 (2d ed. 1953).
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added some interesting embellishments to Kentucky condem-
nation law. In Commonwealth v. Campbell,47 the Court held
"that it is prejudicial error to include in the [jury] instructions
in a condemnation case the highest and lowest before and after
value fixed by the [expert] testimony." 8 It thereby expressly
overruled Commonwealth v. Spillman,49 in which the Court
had concluded that although it was "preferable" for the judge
not to mention such values, it was not prejudicial to do so.
Reliance was placed upon Commonwealth v. C. S. Brent Seed
Co.,50 which the Court indicated had "said that instructions
should not state either maximum or minimum limits of recov-
ery in condemnation cases."51
Justice Reed wrote a separate concurring opinion, "thor-
oughly disagree[ing] .. . that the instruction should not in-
form the jury of the proper money limits to be taken into ac-
count in making an award." 52 He then explained:
In my view, the jury should be told in the instructions that
they should make an award in the amount they find from the
evidence to be the difference in the fair market value before
and after the taking. They should be further instructed that
this award should not be less than the lowest difference testi-
fied to by any of the expert witnesses nor greater than the
highest difference testified to by any such expert witnesses.
This would eliminate in many instances the necessity of new
trials with their attendant time and expense occasioned
merely because a jury was not given understandable guide-
lines in the instructions.53
In other words, Justice Reed believes that the instructions
should restrict the jury to the range of "differences" testified
11 510 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1974).
IId. at 2.
, 489 S.W.2d 811, 814 (Ky. 1973).
376 S.W.2d 310 (Ky. 1964).
" 510 S.W.2d at 2. While this reference is technically accurate, Brent Seed's
actual holding was that it was not reversible error for a circuit judge to refuse to inform
the jury of the condemnation award set by the county court. This is quite different
from the more typical case, like Campbell, wherein the judge is asked to give instruc-
tions directly restricting the jury to the amounts testified to by the expert witnesses.
However, this difference was expressly recognized and treated as inconsequential in
Commonwealth v. Spillman, 489 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Ky. 1973).
510 S.W.2d at 2 (concurring opinion).
Id. (emphasis added).
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to by the expert witnesses. This might even be an indication
that Justice Reed would prefer unadorned general verdicts
rather than the general verdicts with interrogatories, specifying
"before," "after," and "difference" figures, now characteristic
of condemnation cases.
54
Justice Reed's concurrence is particularly interesting in
light of the other condemnation case to be considered here. In
Commonwealth v. Bowling, 5 the majority5 of the Justices ex-
pressly rejected Justice Reed's range of "differences" approach
by holding that a jury verdict exceeding the largest "differ-
ence" testified to by any expert witness was not defective per
se.57 The majority summed up its position as follows:
Although we do not hold that the difference in market value
as established by a jury verdict must fall within the range of
the differences in market value as established by the evi-
dence, we would not uphold a verdict where there is a flagrant
deviation between the difference in the fair market value
established by the verdict and the difference as fixed by the
evidence, as such deviation would evidence the fact that the
jury, in fixing its before and after values, failed to give due
consideration to the totality of the evidence but, on the con-
trary, used disconnected areas of the evidence to reach a
conclusion not supported by the evidence when viewed in its
proper perspective."
Justice Steinfeld dissented, stressing that the expert wit-
nesses had testified to the "differences" regarding the land
values and that the verdict was inappropriately "not within the
range of the evidence."59 Justice Reed joined in Justice
Steinfeld's dissenting opinion and also placed reliance on his
" See id. at 2-3: "I see no reason to draft instructions to a jury in condemnation
cases in such a fashion that the issue of damages is treated in a manner completely
inconsistent with the way in which the issue is explained to the jury in substantially
all other instances."
5510 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1974).
51 The vote was 4-2, with Justice Osborne not participating.
11 This resulted because the jury chose one of the highest "before" values and one
of the lowest "after" values. Thus, the jury's "difference" came out as $26,000, even
though the greatest "difference" testified to by any one of the expert witnesses was
$24,020. 510 S.W.2d at 4.
510 S.W.2d at 5.
Id. (dissenting opinion).
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own concurring opinion in the Campbell case. 0
The area of controversy involved in these two cases can be
narrowed by briefly indicating the matters on which the Jus-
tices are in agreement with each other. The jury may not set
an "after" value lower than the lowest value testified to by an
expert witness" or higher than the highest value.2 Likewise, it
may not set the "before" value lower than the lowest value
testified to. 3 Although the Justices apparently have never de-
cided a case where the jury set the "before" value too high, they
have indicated that they would also consider this invalid. 4
Moreover, the Justices have very recently reiterated their
agreement that expert testimony may not be relied upon where
it is substantially at variance from reliable nonopinion evi-
dence. 5 Furthermore, the Justices agree that the trial judge
may not mention the highest and lowest "before" and "after"
values in his instructions to the jury." In fact, the Justices
agree that the proper standard in condemnation cases is the
difference between the value of the land before and after the
U See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
" Commonwealth v. S & M Land Co., 503 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1972); Commonwealth
v. Bauman, 468 S.W.2d 315 (Ky. 1971); Commonwealth v. Brooks, 436 S.W.2d 499
(Ky. 1969); Commonwealth v. Cresson, 402 S.W.2d 427 (Ky. 1966); Commonwealth
v. Wynn, 396 S.W.2d 798 (Ky. 1965).
1 Commonwealth v. Stephens' Estate, 502 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. 1973).
3 Commonwealth v. S & M Land Co., 503 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1972).
" See Commonwealth v. Bowling, 510 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1974), wherein the Court
(without objection on this point from the dissenting justices) said:
We have long held that a jury verdict which establishes a before value in
excess of the highest before value of any witness or an after value below the
lesser of the after values established by the witnesses is erroneous and must
be set aside. Com., Dept. of Highways v. Bauman, Ky., 468 S.W.2d 315
(1971); Com., Dept. of Highways v. Wynn, Ky., 396 S.W.2d 798 (1965).
Id. at 4 (emphasis added). However, both of the cases expressly relied upon actual
involved "after" values that were too low, not "before" values that were too high.
" Commonwealth v. Mullins, 510 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Ky. 1974):
We pointed out in Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Nelson, Ky.,
441 S.W.2d 403 (1968), that where the value fixed by expert testimony
greatly exceeds the value shown by nonopinion evidence, that testimony's
lack of rational support will deny it the probative value required to support
an award. It has long been the rule that to the extent that the valuation given
by the expert witnesses is palpably extravagant and inconsistent with known
comparable sales it is without probative value. See Commonwealth, Depart-
ment of Highways v. Tabor, Ky., 402 S.W.2d 434 (1966).
" Commonwealth v. Campbell, 510 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1964).
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"taking. '6 7 They even agree that the relevant evidence will
usually be in the form of expert testimony. 8 So, the only area
of disagreement involves how the before-after difference is to
be ascertained: Whereas the majority of the Justices approve
of utilizing a general verdict with interrogatories,"9 whereby the
jury separately specifies the "before" and "after" figures along
with its ultimate "difference," 0 Justices Reed and Steinfeld
seem to prefer a general verdict that focuses the jury's atten-
tion directly upon the "differences" testified to by the ex-
perts.7' However, since these Justices have not objected to the
usual practice of asking the jury to indicate the "before" and
"after" figures in addition to the "difference" figure, it may be
that they merely want to engraft the "range of differences"
limitation onto the majority's approach.
It seems to this commentator that the Court of Appeals'
decision in Campbell-that it is reversible error for a trial judge
to instruct the jury regarding the highest and lowest "before"
and "after" values indicated by the expert testimony-is cor-
rect. The Court's holding apparently is premised on avoiding
judicial usurpation of the jury's function by de facto decisions
on disputed material facts-the maximum and minimum
limits of recovery." Thus, the Court seeks to assure that the
jury does not feel compelled to render a verdict based on the
testimony if it finds such testimony insufficiently credible-
as, for example, where there is other, nonopinion evidence of
a reliable character that entirely undercuts the expert testi-
mony,73 or where the demeanor or credientials of all of the
67 See generally cases cited in note 61 supra.
"Id.
6 This type of verdict is authorized by Ky. R. Cirv. P. 49.02.
70 Commonwealth v. Bowling, 510 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1974).
Id. at 5 (Steinfeld, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 510 S.W.2d 1,
2-3 (Reed, J., concurring).
72 See Commonwealth v. Spillman, 489 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Ky. 1973), in which the
Court seemingly endorsed the following contention by the Commonwealth:
[The instruction] was erroneous in that it permitted the jury to arrive at a
difference in fair market value without requiring them to listen to any testi-
mony. The trial court in effect gave instructions which assumed a material
fact on which the evidence conflicted, namely, the before and after values
of the subject property as testified to by witnesses for appellant and appel-
lees, respectively.
," Cf. Commonwealth v. Mullins, 510 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Ky. 1974), quoted in relevant
part in note 65 supra.
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expert witnesses are viewed as unsatisfactory. This is a reason-
able position in these cases, where the proceeding is really an
appeal-albeit in trial de novo form-from a determination by
a county court, 74 because the jury could "find" for the "respon-
dent" by rejecting all of the evidence adduced at the trial.75
This would be consistent with the rule" placing the burden of
proof on the party seeking a modification of the lower court's
determination. 7 The drawback to the Campbell rule, of course,
7, See KRS § 177.081-.089, which sets forth the established procedures to be
followed by the Commonwealth in condemnation cases. Basically, § 177.081(3) author-
izes a department (such as "Highways") to request a county to appoint commissioners
(0 177.082(3)) according to specified rules. See § 177.083. The commissioners' report
(setting the landowner's damages) can be appealed to the county court only on the
issue of the propriety of the condemnation proceeding, not on the matter of the dam-
ages caused thereby. § 177.085. An appeal to the circuit court may be filed by either
party regarding the amount of damages provided by the commissioners. § 177.087(1);
§ 177.086(2)-(4). An appeal to the circuit court may also be filed by the Commonwealth
if the county court dismissed the condemnation proceeding. §§ 177.087(2), 177.086(4).
Appeals of damage awards are tried "de novo" by a jury. § 177.087(1). However,
appeals from dismissals are tried to the court without the intervention of a jury. §
177.087(2).
The Eminent Domain Act of 1970, codified in KRS §§ 416.410-.530 (Supp. 1973),
provides an alternate method for condemnation available to all authorized condem-
nors. Under its provisions, the circuit court appoints the commissioners and the county
court's roles are abrogated. § 416.430. The decision on condemnability is a judicial one,
§ 416.470, but damages are ascertained by a jury. § 416.480. Thus, in these two latter
respects condemnation under the "alternate" method is quite similar to the estab-
lished method.
71 See generally Commonwealth v. Snyder, 309 S.W.2d 351 (Ky. 1958); Citizens
Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Jefferson County, 283 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1955).
1' See Ky. R. Civ. P. 43.01(2), which states: "The burden of proof in the whole
action lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side."
The Rules of Civil Procedure are made applicable by express statutory provisions. See
KRS §§ 177.081(4), 416.510. See also Commonwealth v. Snyder, 309 S.W.2d 351,352
(Ky. 1958).
" The following statements from Commonwealth v. Snyder, 309 S.W.2d 351, 352
(Ky. 1958), explain how the burden of proof is allocated under various circumstances:
(a) [Ilnitially the condemner has the burden of proof in the whole action
and ordinarily this burden does not shift to the other party.
(b) If the condemner does not appeal an award, he has been successful in
the action and the original burden of proof is extinguished. If then the
landowner alone appeals, he assumes a new burden of proof on the issue of
damages since he becomes the only party who would be defeated on this issue
if no evidence was introduced.
(c) [W]hen both parties appeal to the circuit court ... the burden of
proof upon a trial of the issue of damages before a jury is upon the condem-
ner.
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is the difficulty that it may cause for circuit judges, one of
whom recently stated the problem in these terms:
[T]here have been numerous condemnation cases ...
which have had to be retried because in using the standard
instructions there is no guide for the jurors and they have on
numerous occasions gone outside the values as testified to by
the various witnesses which have resulted in bad verdicts and
the trials would have to be set aside and retried.
78
Although this problem has been acknowledged as a valid one
by the Court of Appeals, it has been considered subordinate to
the countervailing arguments.
79
A compromise position might be superior to either of the
positions described above, if it could satisfy circuit judges' de-
sires for clear jury instructions without undercutting the appel-
late judges' concern for the integrity of the jury's function.
Perhaps these goals could be achieved by (1) allowing the cir-
cuit judge to restrict the jury's determinations to evidence in
the record but (2) requiring the circuit judge to further instruct
the jury that it could reject all of the evidence if it found none
of it credible. The first part of this compromise position pro-
vides leeway for cases involving credible nontestimonial or non-
opinion evidence;"0 the second part is merely a corollary of the
usual rule that if the "proof" is unsatisfactory, the determina-
tion under appeal is affirmed."' Thus no new ground need be
plowed in order to reach a reasonable resolution of this prob-
lem.
It also seems that the Court of Appeals took the right
position in the Bowling case, which held that the jury's "differ-
ence" figure need not be within the range of "differences" testi-
fied to by the individual expert witnesses.82 The Court's deci-
sion implicitly recognizes that it is nonsensical to ask a jury to
ascertain the ultimate "difference" figure without very direct
consideration of the "before" and "after" figures. This, of
11 Commonwealth v. Spillman, 489 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Ky. 1973), quoting the circuit
judge's explanation for overruling the Commonwealth's objection to his jury instruc-
tion setting numerical limits on the "before" and "after" values.
See id. at 814.
oSee note 65 supra.
, See notes 75-77 supra and text related thereto.
See discussion in text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
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course, is entirely consistent with its decisions of at least the
last ten years, for in 1965 it unmistakably approved this ap-
proach: "Manifestly, in order for the jury to reach a verdict
based upon its findings as to the difference in the "before" and
"after" values it must first agree as to what those two values
are."93 This, in turn, is consistent with the Court's apparently
noncontroversial requirement that the jury accompany its ver-
dict with its findings as to the "before" and "after" figures.84
However, the Court's dictum that, "we would not uphold a
verdict where there is a flagrant deviation between the differ-
ence in the fair market value established by the verdict and the
difference as fixed by the evidence .. .8 is somewhat incon-
sistent with its basic view and seems to place an unnecessary
limit upon it. Instead of treating a so-called "flagrant devia-
tion" as jury error per se, the Court at most should have indi-
cated that a wide variance from the range of differences might
be viewed as creating a rebuttable presumption that "the jury,
in fixing its before and after values, failed to give due consider-
ation to the totality of the evidence."86 This is preferable be-
cause it is possible that a jury could permissibly conclude that
the most convincing evidence in fact supported a very wide or,
on the other hand, a very narrow "difference" figure. The con-
clusion here, then, is that the Court should not have proceeded
beyond its sound holding to its dubious dictum.
It only remains to say that the view of dissenting Justices
Steinfeld and Reed missed the mark. This should be apparent
because they ask the jury to perform in an internally inconsist-
ent and indeed impossible fashion. The inconsistency is caused
by requiring the verdict to set forth "before" and "after"
figures which must be such as to produce a "difference" within
the range of the "differences" testified to. Thus, the jury must
look first at the "before" and "after" figures, then to the "dif-
ference" figure, then to the range of "differences," and then
Commonwealth v. Priest, 387 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Ky. 1965) (emphasis added).
" See id. wherein it is stated: "When the jury reports its determination of "before"
and "after" values, the litigants and the court are apprised of the jury's conclusions
on these two vital points, and the propriety of the verdict as measured against the
evidence is more readily determined."
91 Commonwealth v. Bowling, 510 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1974). See fuller quotation in
text accompanying note 58 supra.
94 rd.
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perhaps reverse the process in the event that the ascertairfed
"difference" happens not to fall with the required range. The
impossibility should be obvious, for on what basis is the jury
to determine the ultimate "difference" figure except by first
arriving at "before" and "after" figures? Quite frankly, this
commentator is totally bewildered by this approach, which
does not appear to rest in any way on authority in analogous
areas of the law.1
7
Ill. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RuLE AS APPLIED TO SICK PAY
BENEFITS
In Davidson v. Vogler," a garden-variety automobile acci-
dent case, the trial judge directed a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff and then submitted the various damages issues to the
jury. The jury arrived at a verdict comprised of amounts attrib-
utable to the plaintiff's medical expenses and his pain and
suffering, but no recovery was provided for either lost wages or
permanent impairment of the plaintiff's earning power. Nu-
merous errors were alleged by the plaintiff, who was quite dis-
satisfied with the jury's total verdict of $1,524.48 for his "whip-
lash" injury. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the issues
involving the alleged "inadequacy" of the verdict and impro-
priety in the determination that the plaintiff had not suffered
any permanent impairment of his earning capacity. 9 Of much
more interest, however, was the Court's reversal of the trial
judge's handling of the lost wages issue on the basis of its
disagreement with his understanding of the "collateral source
rule."90
The collateral source rule, or CSR, may be stated as fol-
lows:
[B]enefits received by the plaintiff from a source collateral
to the tortfeasor . . . may not be used to reduce the defen-
dant's liability for damages. This rule holds even though the
benefits are payable to the plaintiff because of the defen-
91 See generally D. DOBBS, LAW op REMEDIES 312, 379-80 (1973); C. McCoRMICK,
LAW OF DAMAGEs 470-72, 480-81 (1935). Neither of these noted authorities suggests a
"direct" difference approach for injuries to realty or personalty.
" 507 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1974).
s' Id. at 162-63.
Id. at 163-65. Although the Court used the term "collateral source doctrine,"
the more widely-used phrase "collateral source rule" will be used in this discussion.
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dant's actionable conduct and even though the benefits are
measured by the plaintiffs losses."
As a result of the CSR, a plaintiff's recovery of proceeds from
his own medical or accident insurer does not reduce the defen-
dant's liability.2 Likewise, a plaintiffs receipt of gratuities
from disinterested parties does not serve to reduce the defen-
dant's liability. 3 However, a plaintiff's recovery of insurance
proceeds from the defendant's insurer does reduce the defen-
dant's liability because in this situation the "source" of the
payment is not "collateral" to the defendant. 4 These applica-
tions are consistent with the theory of the CSR, which is that
the defendant should not get credit for an amount that actually
lessens the plaintiff's economic injury unless such a reduction
is "equitable," which, in turn, is defined as when the benefits
are derived from the defendant rather than a "collateral"
source. 5 The merit of the rule is much debated, 9 but well be-
yond the scope of this discussion.
In Davidson, the trial court allowed the defendant, over
objection, to ask the plaintiff on cross-examination whether he
in fact had lost any pay due to his injuries; the plaintiff replied
that he had not because "the company paid me."97 Moreover,
the trial judge refused to give the jury any instruction regarding
the plaintiff's receipt of "pay" from his employer during his
period of disability, despite the fact that a pretrial deposition
indicated that the employer had made these payments because
they were due to the plaintiff as "sick pay" in accordance with
the employment contract.9 8
When presented with the sick pay issue, the Court of Ap-
peals seemed to presume that the trial judge had acted in ac-
cordance with its most recent decision regarding the CSR's
" D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.6, at 185 (1973).
,2 Id.
'3 Id.
" Id. at 186.
- RESTATEMENT OF TomRS § 920 (1939).
" See, e.g., D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.10, at 584-87 (1973); Sedler, The
Collateral Source Rule and Personal Injury Damages: The Irrelevant Principle and the
Functional Approach, Part II, 58 Ky. L.J. 161 (1970); Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 741
(1964).
" 597 S.W.2d at 163.
" Id. at 163-64.
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application to lost wages situations. Thus, it immediately
launched into a discussion of Rankin v. Blue Grass Boys
Ranch, Inc.' The Court recalled Rankin in these terms:
"[T]he substance of our holding was that payments made to
a personal injury claimant by his employer because of the
claimant's legal entitlement to them reduces his claim for lost
wages but that workmen's compensation or gratuitous pay-
ments by the employer do not."'' 0 The Court then went on to
suggest that since Rankin had not involved "payments of 'sick
pay' by an employer to a personal injury claimant pursuant to
a contractual arrangement between the employer and the
employee," 10' Rankin should not be viewed as an obstacle to
recovery by the plaintiff in the current case. However, recogniz-
ing that Rankin might be interpreted otherwise, the Court de-
clared: "It is now apparent to us that if the general principle
enunciated in Rankin be literally construed, then payments of
sick pay in such instances would operate to reduce the injured
employee's claim for lost wages."'02 Then, quoting extensively
from American Jurisprudence,"3 the Court concluded as fol-
lows: "[O]ur holding in Rankin is modified to the extent that
the rule expressed therein shall not apply to payments by an
employer for sick pay and vacation pay pursuant to a contract
of the type above mentioned." ' 4
This conclusion was further justified on the ground that
the reduction of the plaintiff's damages by the amount of sick
pay he had received would result in an inequitable "windfall"
to the defendant and would incorrectly deprive the plaintiff of
9 469 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1971).
11 507 S.W.2d at 163 (emphasis added), paraphrasing Rankin v. Blue Grass Boys
Ranch, Inc., 469 S.W.2d 767, 774 (Ky. 1971), which had said: "If those payments were
made because of Rankin's legal entitlement to them, then Rankin did not suffer lost
wages to that extent."
101 507 S.W.2d at 163 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
101 Id., quoting 22 Am. JuR. 2d Damages § 208, at 291 (1965), as follows:
Where payment is made by the employer pursuant to such a contract, the
cases are nearly unanimous that the tortfeasor cannot deduct these pay-
ments from the total recovery. Any amounts paid to the plaintiff-employee
pursuant to one of these contract plans should not be deducted from his
recovery from the tortfeasor, because the right to payment was earned as a
part of the employee's compensation prior to the injury.
,", 507 S.W.2d at 164.
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a "valuable vested right, i.e., the right to use sick days. . . in
the future which accrued to him prior to the injury and to
receive pay therefor."'' Thus, the admissibility of evidence
that the plaintiff had received compensation for his lost time
from his employer was stated to be limited to "circumstances
coming within the Rankin rule, as herein modified"'' 5 and the
issue of "malingering. '" 107 The Davidson case was remanded for
a new trial solely on the issue of lost wages; at that trial the
judge, outside of the jury's presence, would consider the reason
the employer had paid the employee for his lost time."8
Only a few words need be said about the Court's disposi-
tion of the CSR-sick pay issue in Davidson. First, and probably
most important, the Court succeeded in reaching the correct
result, for, assuming the general justifiability of the CSR, the
sick pay situation falls well within the rule. Consider, for exam-
ple, the Restatement view:
[Tihe damages which [the injured party] is entitled to re-
cover are not diminished by the fact that ... as a matter of
contract right ... the transaction results in no loss to him.
Where a person has been disabled and hence cannot work but
derives an income during the period of disability from a con-
tract of. . .employment which requires payment during
such period, his income is not the result of earnings but of
previous contractual arrangements made for his own benefit,
not the tortfeasor's.'09
Moreover, the Davidson decision is consistent with Conley v.
Foster, a 1960 Court of Appeals case in which no reduction was
made from the defendant's liability due to the plaintiffs re-
ceipt of reimbursement for medical expenses from a union fund
to which he had made prior contributions."0 There the Court
said:
I" Id.
,N Id.
"Malingering" refers to an injured party's failure to make reasonable attempts
to "mitigate" his damages by returning to work. See Hellmueller Baking Co. v. Risen,
174 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Ky. 1943).
507 S.W.2d at 164-65.
'" RESTATEMENT OF ToRs § 920, comment e at 620 (1939); accord, D. DOBBS, LAW
Op REMEDIES § 8.10, at 582 (1973); Sedler, supra note 96, at 192-95.
"1 335 S.W.2d 904 (Ky. 1960), expressly overruling Sedlock v. Trosper, 211 S.W.2d
147 (Ky. 1948).
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We now hold that in the absence of an assignment or express
contractual subrogation the injured person may recover med-
ical and hospital expenses incurred in his behalf, at least
where the expenses are paid pursuant to any agreement based
upon the payment of premiums or contributions by or on
behalf of the injured person."'
On the other hand, the Court's opinion in Davidson de-
serves criticism because it lacks genuineness. This defect re-
sults from the Court's effort to persuade the reader that
Davidson merely represents a "modification" of Rankin, when
in fact Davidson is a repudiation and de facto overruling of
Rankin. This is borne out by a careful comparison of the facts
of the two cases, since both involved an employer's legally owed
payments to his employee. Rankin held that the employee's
"legal entitlement" to the payments was fatal to that em-
ployee's claim for lost' wages damages,112 whereas Davidson
held that the "contractual agreement" between the employer
and the employee was not fatal to the employee's claim for lost
wages damages. The only possible explanation for the differing
treatments of Rankin and Davidson might be the theory that
benefits earned through actual employment (e.g., accumulated
sick pay days in Davidson) are to be given preferred treatment
over those derived directly from the employment contract (e.g.,
continued wages during temporary disability in Rankin)."'
However, it had been clearly pointed out even before Rankin
was decided that these two situations merit identical treatment
in the application of the CSR. 1 4 Thus, unless there is some
' 335 S.W.2d at 907.
,,2 Consider this language from Rankin: "The amount allowed at the original trial
for loss of wages shall be credited by such sums, if any, as the jury finds was paid to
Rankin by his employer by reason of the legal duty to pay the amount, and the
judgment shall be amended accordingly." Rankin v. Blue Grass Boys Ranch, Inc., 469
S.W.2d 767, 774 (Ky. 1971). Oddly enough, the Davidson Court quoted the passage
immediately preceding this one, but stopped short of this passage itself. 507 S.W.2d
at 163.
"' Actually the Rankin Court did not know the nature of the payments made by
the injured worker's employer, and thus remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing
in order to find out. 469 S.W.2d at 774. However, its instructions to the trial court were
perfectly clear to the effect that the existence vel non of a "legal obligation" was
crucial. See id.
"I See Sedler, supra note 96, at 192-95; accord, D. DoBBs, LAW OF RMEmDms § 8.10,
at 582 (1973).
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other basis for differentiating the two cases, the conclusion
stands that Rankin has been overruled rather than just modi-
fied. If so, it would have been much better for the Court to have
directly said so, thereby avoiding the confusion which may now
ensue. Admittedly, it might have been somewhat embarrassing
for the Court to overrule a case only three years old without any
claim of a material change in circumstances; nevertheless, it
would be preferable for the Court to admit and rectify its mis-
takes as soon as they are recognized.

